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A B S T R A C T   
Why do central states accept holding independence referendums if they could lose a part of their territory during 
this process? Several variables have been proposed to explain this contradiction, but the most robust one has 
proved to be the competition-proximity model formulated by Qvortrup (2014). This paper challenges this theory 
by stressing the role of state peripheries. According to our approach, central governments are more likely to risk 
losing poor and isolated territories if they represent a cost for the host state. Drawing on an updated version of 
the contested sovereignty data set (1776–2019) by Mendez and Germann (2018), this paper demonstrates sta-
tistically that the “peripheriness” variables related to the economy and – especially – location are significant. 
Consequently, the competition-proximity model remains the best-fitted scheme for explaining central govern-
ments’ decision-making, but it can be amended slightly by taking into account the peripheral nature of separatist 
regions.   
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1. Introduction 
After a period of relative stability, the number of independence ref-
erendums has increased dramatically over the last 30 years (Wall et al., 
2017; Cuadras-Morató and Rodón, 2019). In most countries, substate 
units’ nationalist leaders have urged their states of reference to organize 
polls about the separation of the national territory. Recently, in South-
ern Sudan (2011), Scotland (2014), Crimea (2014), Kurdistan (2017), 
Catalonia (2017), New Caledonia (2018), and Bougainville (2019), 
electors were asked to decide whether their territory should become an 
independent state or not. 
Strictly speaking, secession can be defined as “a process of with-
drawal of a territory and its population from an existing state and the 
creation of a new state on that territory” (Pavković and Radan, 2011,1). 
Thus, this definition only applies to substate units and does not include 
cases of accession/withdrawal of a state to/from a supranational orga-
nization. Independence referendums are usually proposed as in-
struments for resolving the tension between two principles (Griffiths, 
2016). On the one hand, the right to self-determination of national mi-
norities is mentioned in Article 1 of the Charter of the United Nations.1 
On the other hand, state constitutions usually guarantee the protection 
of the territorial integrity of their sovereign states by ruling out the right 
to self-determination (Fisch, 2015). As there is no example of recon-
nection after a separation ratified by an independence referendum, the 
organization of an independence referendum must be considered as an 
important decision that can profoundly modify the political, economic, 
and social equilibriums of a given area (Horowitz, 2003). 
So why do state leaders accept holding independence referendums? 
Or in the words of Bogdanor (1994), 37), “Why should [a government] 
seek to put at risk its own legislation by calling for the verdict of the 
people upon it?” At first sight, state executives have no incentive to 
organize polls about the secession of a part of their territory that could 
provoke similar demands in other regions (Walter, 2009). Nevertheless, 
while most self-determination referendums are not accepted by central 
administrations (as in Catalonia in 2017), others are negotiated and 
* Corresponding author. Area of Political Science, Building 14, 4th floor, Office 22, Universidad Pablo de Olavide, 41013, Seville, Spain. 
** Corresponding author. Doctoral School, Building 44, Universidad Pablo de Olavide, Seville, Spain. 
*** Corresponding author. Department of Education, UDIMA, Madrid, Spain. 
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1 But it must be stressed that this principle is tempered by some resolutions of the United Nations like Resolution 2526, adopted in 1970, and Resolution 1514, 
adopted in 1960. 
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